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RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE. By Leon Green. Kansas City: Vernon Law
Book Company, 1927. Pp. viii, 216.
The main thesis of Mr. Green's interesting book is this: Many problems that
have been nominally dealt with under the general appellation "Proximate Cause"
and allocated to the jury with varying degrees of liberality are in reality not
problems of causation at all but problems of law to be settled by the court, not
the jury, in determining the scope of the rule of law which the plaintiff is in-
voking. "An interest having been recognized as worthy of protection, how
much protection shall it be given? Against what risks shall it be protected?
What are the limits of the rule invoked? Does the rule afford protection
against the hazard which the plaintiff's interest has encountered? This is the
exact inquiry." (P. 13.)
Mr. Green does not assume that the decision in each particular case is made
easy by this approach, but only that the rational mode of reaching decisions is
set up. He does not claim to have cut the Gordian knot of proximate cause,
but only to have designated the tools which when properly handled will enable
the courts with greater skill to attain that happy consummation. "The hazards
to which any interest is subjected are so numerous, and the reach of any rule
which the plaintiff may invoke in its vindication is so poorly defined, and there
are so few external guides to tell a court whether a particular hazard is within
the range of the rule invoked, that the problem may well prove bewildering.
Nevertheless, the court must determine it in every case, consciously or other-
wise. The judicial power cannot function in any other way. It is a problem
solely for the judge and the jury has no part to play in its determination. It is
at this point that the law-making function of the courts is most frequently em-
ployed. It is here that the great bulk of what we call law-the aggregate of
legal rules.with their limitations-is built up. Just as the courts extend the law
in the recognition of interests which have been thought to be worthy of the
law's protection, so in defining the limits of that protection they exercise an
equally expansive power. And the process is applicable to interests recognized
by legislative authority in exactly the same manner." (P. 12.)
Two illustrations, taken at random from the numerous ones in the book, will
make the nature of the problem, as the author conceives it, clearer. "An act re-
quiring vessels carrying live stock to be fitted out with pens of small dimensions
to prevent a spread of infectious disease was not complied with by the defend-
ant and during the voyage the plaintiff's sheep were swept overboard by a rough
sea. Had the vessel been provided with pens such loss would not have been
sustained. The plaintiff relied for recovery on the terms of the act. Kelly,
C. B., said: 'But, looking at the Act, it is perfectly clear that its provisions were
all enacted with a totally different view; there was no purpose, direct or in-
direct, to protect against such damage; but as is recited in the preamble, the Act
is directed against the possibility of sheep or cattle being exposed to disease on
the way to this country; * * * the damage complained of here is something
totally apart from the object of the Act of Parliament, and it is in accordance
with all the authorities to say that the action is not maintainable.' Pigott, B.:
'Admit there has been a breach of duty; admit there has been a consequent in-
jury; still the legislature was not legislating to protect against such an injury,
but for an altogether different purpgse; its object was not to regulate the duty
of the carrier for all purposes, but only for one particular purpose.'" (P. 25.)
"The same process is inevitable in suits based upon the rules of the common
law. The fact that the rule is statutory or of common law origin can make no
difference.
"A plaintiff was hurt by reason of a defective wheel of an automobile in
which he was riding. He purchased the car from a retail dealer, but he sued
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the manufacturer with whom he had no contract relation and alleged its negli-
gence in failing to inspect the car properly. The question was whether the
plaintiff's right to be free from bodily harm was within the protection of the
rule of law here invoked, i.e., the duty on the part of the manufacturer to in-
spect. It was decided in favor of the plaintiff. The whole line of cases involv-
ing the liability of a manufacturer to third persons presents the same problem."
(P. 28.)
"In ScJheffer v. Railway, the plaintiff alleged that as a result of a wreck
caused by the negligent collision of the defendant's trains, Scheffer, deceased,
was so injured in body and mind that he took his own life. The court sus-
tained a demurrer to the declaration, holding the defendant's negligence too re-
mote. Surely causal connection was not wanting in the allegations. Had im-
becility or tuberculosis resulted from the injuries received, the court would not
have reached such a conclusion. If the deceased, while in a delirium as a re-
sult of his injuries, had torn off his bandages and infected his wounds so that
blood poisoning had set in, no such conclusion would have been reached. The
meaning of the decision is merely that this character of result is not within the
protection of the rule of law relied on by the plaintiff. Suicide as a result of a
deranged mental condition is not a risk which a defendant incurs by negligently
hurting another. The question is not one of causal connection, but one of fix-
ing the boundaries of a legal rule, and it is doubtful that such are correctly
marked out in this instance. There is no such holding under the Workmen's
Compensation Act." (P. 37.)
The judicial technique necessitated by this method of handling proximate
cause is full of obvious difficulties, but they are perhaps no greater than the
difficulties involved in any process of making or declaring law. With the
author's consent we here set forth brief excerpts from some correspondence
relative to this particular item. The writer of this review placed the matter
before Mr. Green in the following form: "My difficulty centers in the main
around your thesis relative to hazard. If you will be good enough to put on
your judicial robes and mount the bench, I shall ask you as judge in several
cases to give me your judicial mental processes.
"1. I call your attention to the Parry case on page 95 of your book. Will
your honor please explain why or why not the final injury was such a hazard as
fell or did not fall within the scope of the rule of law which obligated defendant
to take care of deceased?
"2. Please analyze Gilman v. Noyes, also on page 95, with reference to the
same factor?"
Mr. Green's reply to these inquiries is as follows: "In the Parry case I am
trying to say about this: D undertook to look after deceased when the latter
needed attention, therefore it owed him, as we say, the duty of reasonable care.
The defendant violated that duty by letting deceased get away (that is, it was
reasonably foreseeable that deceased would probably get hurt if let go, hence
the duty to take cafe; failing in this, there was negligence) ; deceased was hurt
and clearly D's wrongdoing was one of the material factors contributing to the
result. Though all of these three might be jury questions, they are easy ones;
D was negligent, deceased was killed, as a result of such negligence. But to my
mind no one of these suggests the real difficulty of the case. These three fac-
tors, negligence, damage and causal relation, are conclusive only when it is first
assumed that the risk or hazard or injury as it actually took place, is a risk, etc.,
which the rule D violated is designed to give protection against. Was the haz-
ard of being run over by a train five miles out, one within the protection given
by the rule D violated? This was a question calling for the bounding of the
limits of protection given deceased under the rule. It was for the judge, for if
such a hazard was too far out of line, beyond the scope of the protection af-
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forded by the rule invoked, then that would end the case. On the other hand,
if not too far out of line, then the questions of negligence, causal relation,
damages, were still to be solved.
"Now how was the court to know whether the hazard was protected against?
Here as I have repeatedly said, no formula can be laid down. In this case my
own sense of fairness as to what the rule was designed to protect against is
satisfied by holding the defendant under a liability. I think violent physical in-
jury was clearly one of the things against which protection should be given un-
der this rule. But if deceased had wandered off and into a pest-house five miles
out and had contracted small-pox, had he been taken up as a vagrant and put in
jail, had stolen bananas and gotten arrested, had falsely imprisoned some one
and been sued for damages, I would likely be just as certain the other way.
Yet in each of these cases the defendant would be negligent, there would be
causal relation and there would be damages. I would say that the rule was not
designed to protect against such hazards, though some other judge might differ
with me on close cases. But this cannot be helped, and conflicting decisions on
such points cannot be classed as right and wrong; the difference is a matter of
judgment.
"2. I would deal with the bear case (Gilmnan v. Noyes) the same way. Here,
negligence, causal relation and damages were just about as clear as could be. But
when defendant left the bars down and violated a rule of law (the rule of law
that demands reasonable care) what hazards or risks were imposed upon him?
Was the risk that bears would get the sheep a risk that he took? I suggest that
this is a question of bounding or defining the protection that the particular rule
of law afforded P. It was for the court to say whether this risk fell within or
without the rule. (Incidentally Ladd's opinion in that case is the clearest piece
of analysis that I have found to support my suggestion at this point.)
"Now, you ask again, how was the court to know whether this fell within the
rule or not? I will name just some of the factors: (1) The probability of
bears being an agency of destruction for wandering sheep in that neighborhood
is one. (2) Whether a person going on another's land and leaving open his
gaps, etc., should not take the risk whatever the hazard the landowner's stray-
ing stock may encounter (a very strong factor). (3) Whether bears, inasmuch
as they can come into pastures and get the sheep, as well as get them when the
sheep stray, do not constitute such a small risk as not to be taken into account
under any circumstances (note that this is not the same thing as probability).
(4) Whether the straying of domestic sheep to such distances from their haunts
is not such a small risk as not to be taken into account, and as in (3) a risk to
be borne where it happens to fall. (There may be others and doubtless are, but
these indicate some of the considerations that as a judge in passing on the ap-
plicability of a rule of law I should take into account. In this case (2) is so
strong with me personally that I should likely give it very great weight.)"
Under Mr. Green's analysis, the questions which go to the jury, except in those
cases where the answer is so obvious that the judge should declare it, are:
1. In negligence cases, was the defendant negligent?
2. In any case, was the defendant's wrongful act, or omission, a cause in fact
of the injury for which the plaintiff is seeking to recover?
3. Was the defendant's wrongful act, or omission, as compared with other
causative elements, a substantial factor in producing the harm in question to the
plaintiff ?
But as he points out, the third item usually fades into relative insignificance
after the court has discharged its function by determining whether the hazard
in question is one which the rule protects against.
We do not feel disposed at this time to attempt a definite appraisal of the
value of Mr. Green's contribution. We readily concede that his views are stim-
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ulating. Both Mr. Green's book and the articles by Professor Joseph W. Bing-
ham in 9 Columbia Law Review, to which Mr. Green pays a well-deserved
tribute, will bear further study. For the present we are content to leave them
on the knees of the gods.
Finally, on Mr. Green's behalf, we note the following corrections, the need
of which our correspondence brought to light: on page 154, in the first sentence
of the last paragraph, the word "defendant's" should be substituted for the
word "claimant's"; and on page 156, in the third line, the letter "D" should be
substituted for the letter "A."
WLLIAm G. HALE.
Washington University School of Law.
HANDBOOK op FEvmA JuRIsDCnON & PRoCmURx. By Armistead M. Dobie.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1928. Price $4.50.
This publication is the latest contribution to this particular field of jurispru-
dence, and it merits the highest commendation as a textbook on that subject,
which now occupies a permanent part of the curriculum of every well conducted
Law School. Professor Dobie, who is also the author of a work on Bailments,
has for many years occupied the chair of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure in
the University of Virginia, and his present work evidences both his experience
as a teacher and his recognition of the necessity for a modem, up-to-date text-
book on this important subject.
The Act of February 13, 1925, effected a far-reaching change in the prior fed-
eral appellate jurisdiction and rendered practically useless, both to lecturer and
practitioner, all former textbooks on this phase of the subject. The Wizner case
(203 U. S. 449), until finally expressly overruled by the decisions of the U. S.
Supreme Court in Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 260 U. S. 653 and Gen-
eral Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 260 U. S. 261, upset the
prior long-established principles governing removal proceedings and left the law
in a "terrible muddle." The Judicial Code of 1911 has also since been in part
repealed and amended in divers jurisdictional aspects, and Prof. Dobie is to
be congratulated upon having a textbook which brings his subject down to date,
states the law as it exists today, and which should receive the most favorable
consideration by the student, the bench and the bar. In short, it is the last word
on the subject.
The book itself, which is of the well known Hornbook Series, consists of
twelve chapters, the first of which deals with the federal judicial system as a
whole, including under appropriate black letter sub-titles, the organization of
the several federal tribunals, their respective personnel, limitations as to juris-
diction, and a discussion of the concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts under the Judicial Code and the new United States Code.
Then follow Criminal Law & Procedure (Chapter 2); the Original Jurisdic-
tion of the District Courts (Chapter 3) ; Removals (Chapter 4) ; Venue (Chap-
ter 5) ; Original Jurisdiction of Supreme Court (Chapter 6) ; Rule of Decision
at Law (Chapter 7) ; The Conformity Act (Chapter 8); Equity Jurisdiction &
Procedure (Chapter 9); Appellate Jurisdiction of Circuit Court of Appeals
(Chapter 10) ; Appellate Jurisdiction of Supreme Court (Chapter 11); and Ap-
pellate Procedure Generally (Chapter 12). The Appendix includes the Equity
Rules, the Judicial Code, and the Supreme Court Rules, which are set out in
haec verba.
The citations are numerous, well chosen, and with particular reference to more
recent decisions, many of which may be found in volume 275 of the Supreme
Court reports. Frequent notes on said decisions further elucidate and explain
the text. The chapters on Removals, Venue, Rule of Decision at Law, Con-
formity Act, Equity Jurisdiction & Procedure, and Appellate Procedure, deserve
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